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JUL 5 1955

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Director of Communications

Appendix I of Report of the Hoover Commission Task Force  
on Intelligence Activities

1. I have reviewed Appendix I (Parts 1 and 2) of the Task Force Report on Intelligence Activities. My comments on Part 1 which deals with communications security matters are attached. With respect to Part 2, which deals with communications support of Intelligence operations, I have the following comments:

Reference Recommendation 1: I am not convinced that there is need to create an additional echelon to review communications and electronics requirements. (See comment on Recommendation 10.)

Reference Recommendation 2: It has been the practice of CIA to consult with the Joint Communications-Electronics Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on broad policy problems concerning communications requirements for the support of CIA. For example, the JCCEC has been provided with the CIA estimated wartime circuit requirements and has agreed to meet them.

Reference Recommendation 3: No comment.

Reference Recommendation 6: No comment.

Reference Recommendation 7: Insofar as CIA is concerned the recommended action has been taken. Communications channels are installed and tested to provide communications from the CIA Relocation Center to its overseas stations and to other Government agencies.

Reference Recommendation 8: The CIA has and will continue to make every effort to reduce cryptographic violations to the minimum.

Reference Recommendation 9: I believe the responsibility to provide additional controls on the use of clear text messages should be assigned to the USCSB and not to the NSC as recommended. A proposal to this effect has been submitted by the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations).

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Appendix I of Report of the Hoover  
Commission Task Force (contd.)

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
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With the exception of [ ] traffic, all CIA electrically transmitted messages are encrypted in Category A Systems which offer maximum protection to CIA's transmissions.

Reference Recommendation 10: I am not aware of any duplication in the intelligence services due to overemphasis of security consideration nor does the study point out any.

2. Part 2 of Annex 1 of the reference report is so generalized that I find it difficult to make specific comments or recommendations. The study points out where duplication or inefficiencies could exist but does not state whether or not in the opinion of the investigator that it does exist. On the basis of a possible duplication the study then recommends the creation and maintenance of additional high level committees to provide continuous review. It is my personal belief that the present practice of having ad hoc investigations of Government activities is most desirable, but that additional echelons and high level reviewing committees should be established only when a definite need exists and then to solve specific problems or deficiencies. In my opinion, the creation of an additional communications group would further complicate an already complex problem, and would duplicate and conflict with the responsibilities and activities of the Telecommunications Planning Committee, JCEC, and other working groups.

3. I am prepared to elaborate on the above if there is need for additional detail.

Attachment  
(Comments on Part I,  
Appendix I of Hoover Com.  
Task Force on Intel. Activities)



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Comments on Part I, Appendix I of the Hoover Commission Task Force  
on Intelligence Activities

Reference Recommendation #4:

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1. There is no question concerning this aspect of the recommendation. To achieve this increased security, as the report points out, the Services and NSA must be given the necessary potential for development in this field. This potential is manpower. We must recognize that in order to attract qualified individuals to the service we must be willing and able to pay salaries commensurate with those in equivalent industry. Since the development of cryptographic equipments is primarily the responsibility of NSA, recommendations to increase their capabilities in this field should be made by them.

2. USCSB should be responsible for the study. A subcommittee should be established under USCSB to conduct the study, within the limitations of NSC 168, and to make the necessary recommendations. The recommendations should include a statement of policy, which can be later issued as a USCSB or NSC directive: (1) establishing the authority to prescribe minimum standards for the development of communications procedures which will provide and maintain transmission security, and (2) requiring the various departments and agencies of the Government to submit periodic reports to USCSB which will indicate that they have examined their communications security systems, procedures and practices and have determined that they are operating in conformance with the prescribed minimum standards.

3. The above subcommittee should also be charged with the responsibility for reexamining NSC 168.

Reference Recommendation #5:

1. I believe it is inadvisable at this time to establish a single board as recommended. Although many of the matters which are of interest to USCSB are also of interest to USCIB, the primary functions and responsibilities of these two boards are sufficiently divergent to justify their separate existence.

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